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1 Introduction 
 
A company is an artificial person and has no mind, will or hands of its own. It 
is, therefore, compelled to act through human agents. The board of directors 
is responsible for the management and direction of the business affairs of 
the company. Under South African company law the directors’ powers of 
management are statutorily entrenched (S 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008). The board of directors may, however, delegate its powers to an 
individual director (or individual directors), a committee of the board, a 
managing director or other officers of the company. Before an individual 
director or officer of the company can conclude a binding transaction on 
behalf of their company, they must have the authority to do so. In South 
Africa, the issue of authority to enter into a transaction or agreement on 
behalf of a company is dealt with using the principles of the law of agency. 
    The crisp issue in this note relates to the circumstances in which an 
individual company director or officer who, when contracting with another 
person, purports to be acting on behalf of the company will bind the 
company. In the recent case of Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd ([2016] ZACC 
13 (hereinafter “Makate v Vodacom”)), which involved a claim for reasonable 
compensation by the inventor of the concept of “Please Call Me” against 
Vodacom (Pty) Limited (hereinafter “Vodacom”), the Constitutional Court 
dealt specifically with the authority of a director to conclude a contract with a 
third party on behalf of the company. This note discusses Makate v 
Vodacom and the approach of the court regarding when a company will be 
bound by contracts concluded by its director or another person purporting to 
represent the company in a transaction with a third party. It examines the 
main judgment of Jafta J and the concurring judgment of Wallis J in relation 
to the legal nature of ostensible authority in the absence of actual authority. 
    The note further looks at the issue of prescription, which Vodacom in its 
defence raised against the claim for compensation brought by Mr Makate. It 
explores the circumstances in which prescription can be successfully 
invoked to deflect a contractual claim brought against a company, the impact 
of the Constitution in this area of the law and whether the claim lodged by Mr 
Makate amounted to a “debt” for purposes of the Prescription Act (68 of 
1969). To this end, again, both the main judgment of Jafta J and the 
concurring judgment of Wallis J are examined. This is followed by critical 
insights on the implications of this case and some concluding remarks. 
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2 Factual  background 
 
2 1 Facts 
 
The applicant in this matter was Mr Kenneth Makate, a former employee of 
the respondent, Vodacom (Pty) Limited. While serving as a trainee 
consultant at Vodacom, Mr Makate conceived a business idea of a new 
product known as “Please Call Me”. In terms of his idea, a cellphone user 
who does not have airtime would be able to request a call from another 
cellphone user. Mr Makate intended to sell his idea to Vodacom or any other 
cellphone company that would be willing to buy it. He related his idea to his 
mentor, Mr Muchenje, the Head of Vodacom’s Finance Division. Based on 
his mentor’s advice, Mr Makate further discussed his idea with the Director 
of Product Development and Management, Mr Philip Geissler. Mr Makate 
and Mr Geissler then agreed that should Vodacom develop a commercially 
viable product based on Mr Makate’s idea, Vodacom would compensate Mr 
Makate for the use of his idea. They, however, agreed that they would 
discuss the amount of the compensation at a later date after the new product 
had been successfully launched. They further agreed that if they failed to 
reach an agreement on the amount of the compensation, the matter would 
be referred to Vodacom’s Chief Executive Officer, Mr Knott-Craig, for his 
determination of the amount. 
    Vodacom subsequently developed and launched a commercially 
successful new product called “Please Call Me”, based on Mr Makate’s idea. 
Mr Makate, the author of the concept, received praises from inter alia Mr 
Geissler and Vodacom’s Managing Director, Mr Mthembu, for his idea. It is 
noteworthy that the “Please Call Me” product was launched before 
Vodacom’s Board approved it on 15 March 2001. This was in line with the 
common practice within Vodacom to make and implement business 
decisions before the board approved such decisions. Although “Please Call 
Me” became a commercially successful product, Vodacom neither 
compensated Mr Makate nor negotiated the compensation due to him for the 
use of his idea to develop the lucrative product. 
 
2 2 The  trial  court 
 
Mr Makate instituted a lawsuit in the High Court to enforce his verbal 
contract with Vodacom represented by its director, Mr Geissler, in 2008 (see 
Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Limited (08/20980) [2014] ZAGPJHC 135). In his 
particulars of claim, he alleged that Mr Geissler had ostensible authority to 
conclude the contract with him on Vodacom’s behalf and argued that 
Vodacom was bound by the resultant contract. He, therefore, prayed for an 
order compelling Vodacom to comply with its obligations under the contract. 
Alternatively, Mr Makate sought development of the common law (as 
provided for in s 39(2) of the Constitution) through infusion of the 
Constitutional values of ubuntu and good faith into it, as well as an order 
compelling Vodacom to negotiate in good faith with him to determine a 
reasonable compensation for the use of his idea. Notably, at the time that Mr 
Makate sued Vodacom, he had terminated his employment with Vodacom 
and four years had lapsed since the launch of the “Please Call Me” product. 
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    In its special pleas, Vodacom argued inter alia that Mr Makate’s claim had 
prescribed in terms of section 11(d) of the Prescription Act (68 of 1969). In 
the main plea, Vodacom denied the existence of the agreement between Mr 
Makate and Mr Geissler (the latter representing Vodacom). It further claimed 
that Mr Geissler did not have actual or ostensible authority to conclude the 
contract on its behalf. 
    The four main issues before the High Court related to whether there was 
an agreement between Mr Makate and Mr Geissler; whether, if such an 
agreement existed, it bound Vodacom; whether Mr Makate’s claim arising 
from that agreement had prescribed; and whether the common law could be 
developed in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution such that the court 
could compel Vodacom to negotiate a reasonable compensation in good 
faith with Mr Makate for the use of his idea. 
    The High Court found that, on a balance of probabilities, Mr Makate had 
successfully established the existence of the contract between himself and 
Mr Geissler. However, the High Court also found that Mr Makate had not 
properly pleaded the ostensible authority on the part of Mr Geissler to 
conclude the contract on behalf of Vodacom. It ruled that the ostensible 
authority could only be pleaded in replication. At par 157 of its judgment, the 
High Court stated as follows: 
 
“But it was essential for the plaintiff to have pleaded the facts as represented 
to him, if he was aware of those facts. The estoppel, which is not a cause of 
action, should then have been pleaded in a replication, in response to the 
defendant’s plea.” 
[Emphasis added] 
 
    Therefore, according to the High Court, it was necessary for Mr Makate to 
have pleaded ostensible authority in the replication as such authority is a 
form of an estoppel. The High Court further held that the contract was not 
binding on Vodacom as Mr Makate failed to establish that Vodacom had 
represented that Mr Geissler had authority to enter into the agreement on its 
behalf and also failed to establish the requirements for an estoppel (par 165 
and par 173–174 of the High Court’s judgment). 
    On the issue of prescription, the High Court regarded Mr Makate’s claim to 
be a “debt” in terms of the Prescription Act (68 of 1969) (par 181 of the High 
Court’s judgment). It held that his claim had prescribed since a period in 
excess of three years had lapsed between the date on which the debt arose 
and the date on which the action was instituted. (The High Court found that 
the claim had arisen in November 2000 yet the summons was served on 
Vodacom on 14 July 2005.) 
    Having concluded that the contract did not bind Vodacom and that Mr 
Makate’s claim had prescribed, the High Court deemed it unnecessary to 
consider the remaining issues, including whether the common law should be 
developed. It dismissed Mr Makate’s claim with costs. Both the High Court 
and the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed his subsequent application for 
leave to appeal. He eventually approached the Constitutional Court for leave 
to appeal. 
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3 Issues  before  the  Constitutional  Court 
 
There were two key issues that the Constitutional Court had to decide. The 
first was whether the agreement concluded by Mr Geissler with Mr Makate 
was binding on Vodacom – i.e. was the ostensible authority of Mr Geissler to 
conclude a binding contract on behalf of Vodacom properly pleaded and 
established by Mr Makate? The second key issue related to whether Mr 
Makate’s claim had prescribed. 
 
4 Main  judgment  by  Jafta  J 
 
4 1 The  issue  of  ostensible  authority 
 
The main judgment delivered by Jafta J found that the High Court was 
correct in its conclusion that Mr Makate had successfully established the 
existence of an agreement between himself and Mr Geissler. Regarding 
whether Mr Geissler’s ostensible authority to conclude the contract on behalf 
of Vodacom was properly pleaded, the main judgment held that the High 
Court had followed the approach that Mr Makate relied on estoppel which, 
as a shield to a defence of lack of authority, can only be pleaded in 
replication. It held that the High Court’s approach to the pleadings in this 
regard was incorrect and had conflated ostensible authority with estoppel 
(par 44). 
    The main judgment found that although South African courts have at 
times regarded ostensible authority and estoppel as the same thing (South 
African Broadcasting Corporation v Coop [2009] ZASCA 30; 2006 (2) SA 
217 (SCA) and NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce Company Pty Ltd [2001] 
ZASCA 107; 2002 (1) SA 396 (SCA)), these two concepts are distinct. Each 
of them has its own unique elements with the exception of representation by 
the principal (whether express or by conduct) which is common to both 
estoppel and ostensible authority (par 46). 
    The main judgment held that ostensible/apparent authority is distinct from 
an estoppel in that the former refers to a situation where a misrepresentation 
creates an appearance that the agent has the power to act on the principal’s 
behalf whereas the latter is not a form of authority at all (par 46). Jafta J 
emphasised the point that whereas estoppel may be used as a shield 
against the defence that a party does not have actual authority, 
ostensible/apparent authority refers to the agent’s authority as it appears to 
others. Citing a pronouncement by Lord Denning MR in the leading case of 
Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd ([1968] 1 QB 549 (CA)), the main judgment 
held that for ostensible authority to be established all that must be shown is 
that the principal, either by words or by conduct, “has created an 
appearance that the agent has the power to act on its behalf” (par 47). Jafta 
J further explained as follows (par 47): 
 
“The means by which that appearance is represented need not be directed at 
any person. In other words, the principal need not make the representation to 
the person claiming that the agent had apparent authority. The statement 
indicates the absence of the elements of estoppel. It does not mention 
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prejudice at all. That statement of English law was imported as it is into our 
law in NBS Bank and other cases that followed it.” 
 
    The main judgment further found that, while ostensible/apparent authority 
refers to the authority of the agent as it appears to others, estoppel is simply 
a rule that prevents the principal (who has represented to the third party that 
the agent has authority) from denying that he gave authority to the agent 
(par 45 and par 75). It confirmed the four essential elements of estoppel as 
the following: 
(a) representation made in words or by conduct, including silence or 
inaction; 
(b) the representation must have been made by the principal to the third 
party that raises estoppel; 
(c) the principal must reasonably have expected that its conduct may 
mislead the third party; and 
(d) the third party must reasonably have acted on the representation to its 
own prejudice. 
    Regarding whether Mr Geissler’s ostensible authority had been 
established, the main judgment held that the High Court had incorrectly 
applied the test for estoppel instead of applying the test (essential elements) 
for ostensible authority and had, consequently, arrived at an incorrect 
conclusion. The correct test to be applied was whether as it appears to 
others, Mr Geissler had the authority to act on Vodacom’s behalf. This 
question must be considered with the purpose of achieving justice to all the 
parties concerned (par 64–65). 
    Applying the above test for ostensible authority, the main judgment held 
that Mr Makate had indeed established that Mr Geissler had ostensible 
authority to bind Vodacom. In this regard, it considered Mr Geissler’s 
position as a director of Vodacom, the power that he had in respect of the 
introduction of new products, the organisational structure within which he 
exercised his power and the process which had to be followed before the 
introduction of new products at Vodacom. 
    Having found that Mr Geissler’s ostensible authority was properly pleaded 
and established, the main judgment considered it superfluous to consider 
whether the common law could be developed in terms of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution. 
 
4 2 The  issue  of  prescription 
 
The main judgment considered the finding made by the High Court that Mr 
Makate’s claim had prescribed due to the action having only been instituted 
after the lapse of more than three years from the time the debt arose. Having 
initially requested the High Court to address the issue of prescription by 
developing the common law of contract through infusion of the Constitutional 
values of ubuntu and good faith into it, Mr Makate went further to ask the 
Constitutional Court to invoke section 39(2) of the Constitution to declare 
that the Prescription Act (68 of 1969) unduly limited his right of access to 
court by declaring that his claim had prescribed (par 29). 
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    Jafta J acknowledged that the present case offered an opportunity to 
interpret the Prescription Act (68 of 1969) in terms of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution. He observed that, while the High Court had interpreted the 
relevant provisions relating to prescription based on pre-Constitution 
authorities anchored on the supremacy of Parliament, section 39(2) 
introduced a different approach to statutory interpretation (par 30). He further 
noted that whether or not Mr Makate’s claim had prescribed depended on 
the proper interpretation of section 10(1) read with sections 11(d), 12(1) and 
12(3) of the Prescription Act (68 of 1969) (par 32). Section 10(1) of the 
Prescription Act (68 of 1969) provides that a debt will be extinguished by 
prescription after the lapse of the period designated for such debt in terms of 
the relevant law; section 11(d) declares three years as the prescription 
period for any debts not covered by section 11(a), (b) and (c) except where 
an Act of Parliament provides otherwise; section 12(1) provides that 
prescription will start to run immediately when the debt becomes due, but 
subject to the provisions of subsection (2) and (3); and section 12(3) 
provides that a debt is not deemed to be due until the creditor knows the 
identity of the debtor and the facts from which the debt arises. 
    The main judgment found that the High Court’s decision that Mr Makate’s 
claim had prescribed was based on its interpretation of the word “debt”, 
which it found to have a wide meaning (par 82). The High Court had relied 
on the judgment of the then Appellate Division in Desai NO v Desai (1996 
(1) SA 141 (A)) and the decision of the then Cape of Good Hope Division in 
LTA Construction v Minister of Public Works and Land Affairs (1994 (1) SA 
153 (A)) to arrive at that conclusion. The relevant passage in the Desai case 
relied upon by the High Court to ascribe “debt” a wide meaning read as 
follows: 
 
“S10(4) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (“the Act”) lays down that a ‘debt’ 
shall be extinguished after the lapse of the relevant prescriptive period, which 
in the instant case was three years (see section 11(d)). The term “debt” is not 
defined in the Act but in the context of section 10(1) it has a wide and general 
meaning, and includes an obligation to do something or refrain from doing 
something” (see par 83). 
 
    This interpretation of the Desai decision, according to Jafta J, suggests 
that all claims requiring a party to do something or to refrain from doing 
something, irrespective of what that “something” is, amount to a “debt” as 
contemplated in section 10(1). However, Jafta J noted that there is nowhere 
in the Desai judgment where the Appellate Division made reference to 
anything in section 10(1) that showed that “debt” was used in the sense 
purported by the High Court (par 84). 
    In order to determine whether the pre-constitutional interpretation of the 
relevant provisions of the Prescription Act (68 of 1969) remained good law, 
Jafta J looked to section 39(2) of the Constitution. Section 39(2) provides 
that “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common 
law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”. He ruled that the lack of an 
explanation as to why the High Court had interpreted “debt” so broadly was 
significant considering that this interpretation was inconsistent with previous 
decisions of the same court that accorded the word a more restricted 
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meaning, including those referred to in the Desai case (par 85). If it was the 
intention of the court in Desai to stretch the meaning of “debt” beyond the 
one ascribed to it in the earlier cases, Jafta J concluded, this could not be 
deduced from the submissions made by the parties nor from any issues 
arising from the case. He further ruled that having such intent would have 
meant that the court in Desai failed to take the Constitutional imperatives 
relating to the interpretation of statutes in section 39(2) into account (par 86). 
    Quoting the ruling of Van der Westhuizen J in Frazer v Absa Limited 
(2007 (3) SA 484 (CC)) regarding the role of the courts in interpreting 
legislation, Jafta J stressed the centrality of the Constitution in the 
interpretation of statutes by the courts, whose role he said is to promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights contained in section 39(2). He 
further expressed support for the view that section 39(2) created a new rule 
for construing legislation and that this rule is mandatory (par 87). This means 
that the courts must always bear the contents of section 39(2) in mind when 
executing their interpretative role and that if the provision in question has 
implications for the Bill of Rights, the obligation in section 39(2) is triggered. 
He held that where the provision to be interpreted is capable of more than 
one meaning, the objects of the Bill of Rights are advanced if the meaning 
adopted does not limit a right in the Bill of Rights (par 88–89). 
    Reverting to section 10(1) read with sections 11 and 12 of the Prescription 
Act (68 of 1969), Jafta J held that these provisions restricted the rights 
guaranteed by section 34 of the Constitution. In these circumstances, the 
High Court was, therefore, compelled to give effect to section 39(2) 
regardless of whether or not the parties had so requested. This was because 
the operation of section 39(2) is not contingent upon the wishes of the 
parties. The duty embodied in the section is activated the moment the 
provision under interpretation affects the Bill of Rights (par 90). 
    The main judgment referred to earlier Constitutional Court rulings in Road 
Accident Fund v Mdeyide (2011 (2) SA 26 (CC)) (This case dealt with the 
question of whether an obligation constituted a debt envisaged by the 
Prescription Act (68 of 1969). The court held that the effect of failing to meet 
a prescription deadline in terms of the Prescription Act amounted to denying 
a litigant access to a court) and South African Transport and Allied Workers 
Union (SATAWU) v Moloto NO (2012 (6) SA 249 (CC)). It held that where 
the relevant provisions of the Prescription Act (68 of 1969) apply to a specific 
case, the statute must be interpreted in accordance with section 39(2). 
Furthermore, it said the term “debt” must be accorded an interpretation that 
is least invasive of the right of access to the courts. The main judgment 
reaffirmed the position in the SATAWU case that “[c]onstitutional rights 
conferred without express limitation should not be cut down by reading 
implicit limitations onto them …” (par 91). 
    Concerning the issues before the Constitutional Court, the main judgment 
found that there was no need to establish the precise meaning of “debt” 
contemplated in section 10 of the Prescription Act (68 of 1969) since Mr 
Makate’s claim fell outside the scope of the term as discussed in some of the 
earlier cases alluded to above. It found that rather than request enforcement 
of any of the obligations arising from a “debt”, Mr Makate had sought an 
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order compelling Vodacom to negotiate with him to determine compensation 
due to him for the use of his idea (par 92). 
    In the end, the main judgment found that the Desai case was wrong in so 
far as it went beyond what was decided in the cases that preceded it in 
determining the meaning of “debt”. Nothing in those cases suggested that 
“debt” has such a wide meaning as to cover every obligation to do 
something or refrain from doing something besides payment or delivery (par 
93). The main judgment concluded that the High Court had attached an 
incorrect meaning to the term “debt”, and that the debt contemplated in 
section 10 of the Prescription Act (68 of 1969) was not applicable to the 
claim before it. 
 
5 Concurring  judgment  by  Wallis  AJ 
 
5 1 The  issue  of  ostensible  authority 
 
The concurring judgment delivered by Wallis AJ agreed with the main 
judgment that Mr Makate had successfully proved the existence of the 
agreement concluded by him and Mr Geissler, and that the key issue was, 
therefore, whether Vodacom was bound by the agreement. The concurring 
judgment further agreed that, in order to establish that Vodacom was bound, 
it was crucial for Mr Makate to prove that Vodacom had represented that Mr 
Geissler had ostensible authority to conclude the contract with him (par 182). 
    However, the concurring judgment differed with the main judgment 
regarding the jurisprudential characterisation of ostensible authority. 
Whereas the main judgment held that ostensible authority and estoppel are 
two different legal concepts, the concurring judgment held that 
ostensible/apparent authority is a form or instance of estoppel arising from a 
representation of authority. With reference to some leading decisions by 
English courts (Freeman & Lockyer (a firm) v Buckhorst Park Properties 
(Mangal) ([1964] 1 All ER 630); and Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA: The 
Ocean Frost ([1985] 3 All ER 385)) as well as some judgments by South 
African courts both before and after NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce 
Company Pty Ltd (supra)), Wallis AJ argued that the law has consistently 
regarded ostensible/apparent authority as the equivalent of estoppel. (For 
the relevant South African case law authorities, see Strachan v Blackbeard 
and Son (1910 AD 282); Monzali v Smith (1929 AD 382); West v Pollak and 
Freemantle (1937 TPD 64); Insurance Trust & Investments v Mudaliar (1943 
NPD 45); Clifford Harris (Rhodesia) Ltd v Todd NO (1955 (3) SA 302 (SR)); 
Service Motor Supplies (1956) (Pty) Ltd v Hyper Investments (Pty) Ltd (1961 
(4) SA 842 (A)); Connock’s (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal Westelike Ko-
operatiewe Maatskappy Bpk (1964 (2) SA 47 (T)); Inter-Continental Finance 
& Leasing Corp (Pty) Ltd v Stands 56 and 57 Industria Ltd (1979 (3) SA 740 
(W)); Glofinco v Absa Bank ([2002] ZASCA 91); (2002 (6) SA 470 (SCA)); 
and MEC for Economic Affairs, Environment and Tourism v Kruizenga 
([2010] ZASCA 58); (2010 (4) SA 122 (SCA)). 
    Wallis AJ further noted that most academic writers also held the view that 
ostensible/apparent authority is the equivalent of estoppel (Kerr The Law of 
Agency 3ed (1991); De Villiers and Macintosh The Law of Agency in South 
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Africa 3ed (1981); Joubert Die Suid-Afrikaanse Verteenwoordigingsreg 
(1979); De Wet and Yeats “Kontraktereg en Handelsreg” 4ed (1978); Wille 
and Millin’s Mercantile Law of South Africa 18 ed (1984); and Wille’s 
Principles of South African Law 9ed (2007)). 
    Therefore, according to the concurring judgment, in the absence of Mr 
Geissler’s actual authority to conclude the contract on behalf of Vodacom, 
Mr Makate had to prove that Vodacom had represented to him that Mr 
Geissler had ostensible authority; that he had reasonably acted upon that 
representation; and that he had suffered prejudice as a result (par 155–156). 
In other words, it was necessary for Mr Makate to establish estoppel. This is 
different from the approach taken by the main judgment that all that a party 
alleging or pleading ostensible authority needs to prove is that the principal 
has, by words or conduct, “created an appearance that the agent has the 
power to act on its behalf” and that “nothing more is required” (par 47). 
    Applying its analysis of the legal position regarding ostensible authority to 
the facts, the concurring judgment found that Vodacom represented to Mr 
Makate that Mr Geissler had the necessary authority. Mr Makate reasonably 
acted on the basis that Mr Geissler had authority to conclude the agreement 
with him in view of Mr Geissler’s position within Vodacom. He suffered 
prejudice as a result of Vodacom’s use of his idea in a false belief that it 
would compensate him. The concurring judgment, therefore, concluded that 
Mr Geissler had ostensible authority to conclude a binding contract with Mr 
Makate on behalf of Vodacom and that Vodacom was estopped from 
denying that authority (par 184). 
    On the issue of whether ostensible authority (which the concurring 
judgment deemed to be the equivalent of estoppel) had been properly 
pleaded, the concurring judgment held that ostensible authority can be 
invoked not only as a shield, but to create a cause of action as well (par 
122). It dismissed the High Court’s assertion that ostensible authority can 
only be pleaded in replication and found that Mr Makate had properly 
pleaded ostensible authority. This accords with the view taken by the main 
judgment that the High Court erred in holding that ostensible authority can 
only be pleaded in replication. 
    Having held that Mr Geissler’s ostensible authority was properly pleaded 
and established, the concurring judgment concluded that there was no need 
to develop the common in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution as 
suggested by Mr Makate’s counsel. 
 
5 2 The  issue  of  prescription 
 
In the concurring judgment, Wallis AJ agreed with the main judgment on the 
question of prescription. He maintained that the obligation in issue in the 
present case, namely to negotiate reasonable remuneration, was not a debt 
at all since nothing would be due to the applicant from the respondent until 
the negotiations had been finalised. He reasoned that while the Prescription 
Act (68 of 1969) allows debts to be extinguished by prescription the same 
way they would be by payment or performance, in the current case nothing 
was yet in existence that could be extinguished (par 186). He concluded that 
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no debt was due before commencement of the present case which, in turn, 
meant that there could be no question of prescription. 
    In further explaining the court’s ruling, Wallis AJ pointed out that the 
meaning that has been accorded to “debt” in the context of the Prescription 
Act (68 of 1969) is: “[s]omething owed or due, something (as money, goods 
or service) which one person is under an obligation to pay or render to 
another; or a liability or obligation to pay or render something; the condition 
of being so obligated” (par 187). He agreed with the position taken by the 
main judgment that the suggestion in the Desai case that “debt” has a wider 
meaning than the one set out above was wrong. 
    Referring to Absa Bank Limited v Keet (2015 (4) SA 474 (SCA)), the 
concurring judgment drew attention to the fact that not every right to 
approach a court for relief amounts to a debt for purposes of extinctive 
prescription. Notably, in the Keet case, a distinction was drawn between 
acquisitive prescription and extinctive prescription. Whereas the former 
involves the acquisition (along with the corresponding loss) of real rights 
such as ownership, the latter deals with the termination of debts and their 
related rights of action, i.e. personal rights (par 190). 
    Wallis AJ further averred that where a continuing wrong is concerned, 
there could be no question of prescription despite the wrong arising from a 
past single act. This, he asserted, is based on a well-established principle 
that even though the original wrongful act may have occurred at a past time, 
the wrong itself continues for so long as it is not abated (par 192). 
    The concurring judgment concluded that once an agreement had been 
reached on the remuneration due to Mr Makate, his right to recover the 
remuneration from Vodacom would arise. This would be the debt in respect 
of which prescription would have run. As no such agreement had been 
reached, the issue of prescription did not come into the picture (par 194). 
 
6 The  court  order 
 
The Constitutional Court granted Mr Makate leave to appeal and the appeal 
was upheld with costs. It declared that Vodacom was bound by the 
agreement concluded by Mr Makate and Mr Geissler. Vodacom was ordered 
to commence negotiations in good faith with Mr Makate to determine the 
reasonable amount of compensation for the use of his idea in terms of the 
agreement within 30 calendar days from the date of the order. In the event 
that the parties failed to reach an agreement, the Constitutional Court 
ordered that the matter be referred to Vodacom’s Chief Executive Officer for 
his determination of the amount within a reasonable period.  
 
7 Further  discussion 
 
It is trite that for a company director or another agent to enter into a binding 
agreement on behalf of the company, he must be having authority to do so. 
In Makate v Vodacom, the Constitutional Court has affirmed a number of 
long-standing agency principles regarding authority to represent a company. 
These include that such authority may be an actual authority, 
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ostensible/apparent authority or usual authority. (See par 45, in which Jafta J 
referred with approval to Kerr Law of Agency 4ed (2006) 27 on the issue of 
actual authority. See also Cassim FHI, Cassim MF, Cassim R, Jooste, Shev 
and Yeats Contemporary Company Law (2012) 188 at which the learned 
authors point out that in some cases authority to represent the company may 
be given ex post facto through ratification). 
    Citing Lord Denning MR’s judgment in the leading English case of Hely-
Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd (supra) as authority, both the main judgment and 
the concurring judgment in Makate v Vodacom ruled that a company will be 
bound where it has given the director (agent) actual authority to represent it 
in a particular transaction either expressly or impliedly. Express authority 
arises when the company confers authority on the director concerned by 
express words (Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd (supra)). Even though the 
Constitutional Court in Makate v Vodacom did not make a pronouncement 
on the effect of the Turquand rule on representation, it is noteworthy that 
where the express authority of a director to represent the company in a 
transaction is subject to compliance with an internal procedural requirement, 
the common law Turquand rule and section 20(7) of the Companies Act (71 
of 2008) (“the statutory Turquand rule”) will operate to protect a third party 
that is acting in good faith (Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 188). 
The company would, in such circumstances, be bound by the contract 
notwithstanding the non-compliance with an internal procedural requirement. 
    The Constitutional Court also confirmed the legal position that implied 
authority is one that is inferred from the principal’s (company’s) conduct and 
the circumstances of each case (see Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd 
(supra)). In Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd (supra), for example, the court 
expressed the view that when a board appoints one of its members as 
managing director, it confers on him the implied authority as well as the 
ostensible authority to do everything that falls within the scope of the 
managing director’s office. Implied authority may, therefore, also take the 
form of usual authority (see Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 188). 
In terms of usual authority, a director’s authority to represent the company 
may be determined by reference to the particular director’s position within 
the company as well as the duties and responsibilities associated with that 
position. 
    In Makate v Vodacom, the Constitutional Court further confirmed the long-
standing legal position that a third party who entered into an agreement with 
an agent may prevent the company as principal from denying that it had not 
given the necessary authority, by pleading estoppel (Par 45; see also 
Freeman & Lockyer (a firm) v Buckhorst Park Properties (supra)). In such an 
event, the third party will have to prove the essential elements of estoppel as 
discussed in paragraph 4.1 above. 
    One significant change that the decision of the Constitutional Court in 
Makate v Vodacom has brought to South African law is that it has made it 
clear that ostensible/apparent authority is different from estoppel. It, thus, 
overrides earlier court decisions and academic commentary that 
ostensible/apparent authority is a form of estoppel. The decision has altered 
the definition of ostensible/apparent authority and distinguished its essential 
requirements from those of estoppel. Notably, the Constitutional Court held 
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that although ostensible/apparent authority and estoppel may in most 
instances arise out of the same set of facts, they are two separate concepts 
and have different essential elements. According to the main judgment, for 
one to be able to rely on ostensible/apparent authority one simply needs to 
show that the principal, either by words or by conduct, has created an 
appearance that the agent has the power to act on its behalf, and nothing 
more. The only element that is common to both concepts is a representation 
by the principal. It would, therefore, not be necessary for a party wishing to 
rely on ostensible/apparent authority to prove further elements of estoppel, 
namely that the principal reasonably expected that its conduct may mislead 
third parties, reliance by the third party on the representation, the 
reasonableness of the reliance and the consequent prejudice to the third 
party. 
    It is submitted that this aspect of the main judgment in Makate v Vodacom 
is quite problematic in so far as it excludes the elements of reasonableness 
and reliance from the test of ostensible authority. The company would, as a 
result, be bound even if the third party was not induced by the representation 
or was aware or ought to have been aware that the company director or the 
purported representative lacked authority. 
    A further notable aspect of the Constitutional Court’s decision in Makate v 
Vodacom is that the court clarified that ostensible/apparent authority may be 
used to create a cause of action in the absence of actual authority. This 
trumps earlier court decisions and academic commentary that asserted that 
ostensible/apparent authority, as a form of estoppel, can only be pleaded in 
replication, i.e. as a shield when the company raises the defence that the 
director or another purported representative of the company did not have the 
necessary authority to conclude the contract on its behalf. It is, therefore, 
possible for a plaintiff, who foresees that the defendant company will plead 
that the director or other purported representative of the company lacked 
authority, to plead ostensible/apparent authority at the outset rather than to 
wait for the defendant to first plead that the agent lacked authority. This 
further enhances the protection of third parties. The Constitutional Court 
should be applauded for taking a pragmatic and logical approach in this 
regard. 
    A further issue that the Constitutional Court had to determine in this case 
was the correctness of the High Court’s decision to ascribe a meaning to the 
term “debt” that went beyond the interpretation previously given by the same 
court. As pointed out above, in the main judgment Jafta J held that nothing in 
the Desai decision, which was cited as the basis for the High Court’s ruling, 
suggested that “debt” was intended to assume the wider meaning assigned 
to it. He further held that “debt” in the context of the Prescription Act (68 of 
1969) meant “something owed or due”. Likewise, in the concurring judgment, 
Wallis AJ criticised the High Court’s ruling and held that Vodacom’s 
obligation to negotiate reasonable remuneration as claimed by Mr Makate 
was not yet a “debt” since there was nothing due to the applicant until the 
negotiations had been finalised. All this is in line with section 12(1) of the 
Prescription Act (68 of 1969) which provides that prescription will commence 
to run immediately when “the debt is due”. 
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    The position taken by the Constitutional Court in Makate v Vodacom is 
also in accordance with a number of earlier decisions by South African 
courts including, for example, Truter v Deysel (2006 (4) SA 168 (SCA)). In 
the Truter case, the court held that “[f]or purposes of the [Prescription] Act, 
the term ‘debt due’ means a debt, including a delictual debt, which is owing 
and payable. A debt is due in this sense when the creditor acquires a 
complete cause of action for the recovery of the debt, that is, when the entire 
set of facts which the creditor must prove in order to succeed with his or her 
claim against the debtor is in place or, in other words, when everything has 
happened which would entitle the creditor to institute action and to pursue 
his or her claim” (See also Evins v Shields Insurance Co Ltd (1980 (2) SA 
814 (A) 838D–H) and Deloitte Haskins & Sells Consultants (Pty) Ltd v 
Bowthorpe Hellerman Deutsch (Pty) Ltd (1991 (1) SA 525 (A)). 
    Another significant aspect of the ruling in Makate v Vodacom is that it 
emphasises the obligation on a court interpreting legislative provisions to 
take section 39(2) of the Constitution into account. In the post-Constitution 
order in South Africa, the court must always be mindful of whether or not the 
provision it is interpreting will affect the Bill of Rights or not. If it does, the 
court is compelled to adopt an interpretation that gives effect to the spirit, 
purport and object of the Bill of Rights. In this way, section 39(2) has 
reconfigured the rules of interpretation such that, irrespective of the wording 
of a particular provision or the purpose for which it was originally enacted, 
the provision will always be subject to section 39(2) as long as it impacts on 
the Bill of Rights. 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
This note has discussed the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Makate v 
Vodacom regarding the authority of a director to conclude a contract with a 
third party on behalf of the company. It has examined the main judgment 
delivered by Jafta J and the concurring judgment delivered by Wallis AJ, 
focusing on the legal nature of ostensible authority in the absence of actual 
authority as well as the prescription of corporate debts. It further considered 
the impact of the Constitution in the area of prescription. It is submitted that 
whereas the Constitutional Court has affirmed the long-standing agency 
principles applicable to a director or other officer to bind the company, it has 
significantly altered the pre-existing legal position regarding the 
jurisprudential nature of ostensible/apparent authority. Contrary to a long-
standing line of case law authorities and the view held by most academic 
commentators that ostensible/apparent authority is a form of estoppel, the 
Constitutional Court, in its main judgment, has emphasised that 
ostensible/apparent authority and estoppel are two separate concepts that 
have different essential elements. In order to be able to rely on 
ostensible/apparent authority, one only needs to establish that the company 
(principal) has created an appearance that the purported representative has 
authority to act on its behalf. It is not necessary to prove the requirements of 
estoppel. In addition to being a shield against a defence of lack of the 
necessary authority, the ostensible/apparent authority may be used to create 
a cause of action in the absence of actual authority. The effect of the 
judgment is to strengthen the protection of third parties dealing with the 
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company. It appears, however, that in seeking to protect third parties, the 
Constitutional Court went a little bit too far when it excluded the elements of 
reasonableness and reliance from the test of ostensible/apparent authority. 
    On the question of prescription, the Constitutional Court has confirmed the 
position taken in a number of previous judgments to the effect that 
prescription will start to run only when the debt becomes due and payable. It 
dismissed, rightly so it is submitted, the suggestion that the term “debt” must 
be interpreted so widely as to include situations where the obligation to act 
or to refrain from acting has not yet arisen. Instead, the Constitutional Court 
ruled that such a wide interpretation of “debt” deviated from the earlier court 
decisions without any explanation or justification. 
    The note also discussed how the Constitutional Court considers section 
39(2) of the Constitution to be central to the interpretation of statutory 
provisions. Thus, a court interpreting a statutory provision should consider 
whether the provision in question impacts on the Bill of Rights and, if it does, 
the court is compelled to interpret the provision to give effect to the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. The Constitutional Court also 
emphasised that it is not necessary for the litigants to make a request to the 
court to take section 39(2) into account before it can do so. It further said 
that the objects of the Bill of Rights are advanced where the meaning 
adopted does not restrict a right contained in the Bill of Rights. 
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